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NAVAJO GRANDPARENTS-"PARENT" OR
"STRANGER"-A CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATION

On September 9, 1976 the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in
Adoption of Doe,' affirmed a decision of the Bernalillo County
District Court granting the adoption of a Navajo child to Caucasian
petitioners. In reaching this decision the court applied the best
interests of the child doctrine and considered the mother's wishes,
the father's abandonment, and the fitness of the individuals seeking
custody.
The awarding of custody of this three year old Navajo boy to a
Caucasian couple by the New Mexico courts follows a national trend
of removing Indian children from their native environment and
placing them in non-Indian homes. 2 This casenote will review the
judicial development of child custody determinations, will discuss
the best interests of the child doctrine and how it can be applied
when minority children are before the court for custody placement,
and will review the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in
Adoption of Doe.
THE FACTS
The child in Adoption of Doe3 was born to full-blooded, unwed
Navajos. He lived off the reservation in Gallup with his mother and
maternal grandfather and only briefly with his father.4 The child's
grandfather assumed most of the responsibilities for raising the boy
and "provided in his own house for the care, custody and control,
shelter, food and clothing of the child."'
On March 17, 1975 the mother placed the child with petitioners,
Chaparral Home and Adoption Services, and expressed the desire
that her son be placed with a non-Indian family. Chaparral placed the
child with a Caucasian couple, co-petitioners John and Mary Doe,
who two months later filed for adoption. At that time the grandfather filed a writ of habeas corpus for custody of the child. The
1. 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976).
2. McCartney, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide or First
Amendment Preservation, 7 Colum. Human Rts. L. Rev. 529, 529 (1976).
3. 89 N.M. at 612, 555 P.2d at 912.
4. Id at 612, 555 P.2d at 912.
5. Id. at 613, 555 P.2dat 913.
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district court dismissed the writ and the grandfather appealed. The
child's father also appealed in his own behalf.6 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court and granted the adoption petition. 7
CHILD CUSTODY AWARDS
All custody controversies can be classified as one of three types:
parent-parent, parent-stranger, and stranger-stranger. Under the
English common law awards of custody in parent-parent conflicts
were made to the father and children were considered as little more
than chattels.' Viewing children as chattels created the necessary
property right to allow the matter to be heard before the chancellor
in equity. These children became wards of chancery and the crown
acted as parens patriae, parent of the country, in aid of the minors. 9
A mother had no legal right to her children whatsoever unless they
were illegitimate.' 0 Parliament gradually recognized a mother's
rights to custody of her children and in 1925 the Guardianship of
Infants Act gave equal rights to the mother and father.'
In the United States a mother and father have always had equal
rights to custody of their legitimate children but the mother has been
given custody of any illegitimate children.' 2 In most instances in a
parent-parent controversy the mother has been preferred over the
father in custody awards of small children.' '
A traditional approach in deciding custody in parent-stranger
conflicts has been the parental preference rule which "creates a
presumption that the natural parent is preferred over strangers."'"'
Strangers are everyone other than the child's biological parents even
though they may have had physical custody of the child for an
extended period of time.
The New Mexico Children's Code defines legal custody as
a legal status created by the order of a court or tribunal of corn6. Id. at 611, 555 P.2d at 911.
7. Id. at 622, 555 P.2d at 922.
8. Project, California Custody Awards to Non-Parents: A View of Civil Code Section
4600, 2 Pepperdine L. Rev. 458 (1975). "In In Re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613
(1900), '[u Inder the general law... the father has a natural right to the care and custody of
his child. ... [Tihe right of custody is essentially the same as the right of property. For
though the subject of-the right is not saleable, it is valuable and of all species of property the
most valuable to the parent.' "Id. at 459.
9. In ReSantillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 147,138 P.2d 503, 507 (1943).
10. 15 AM. JUR. Proofof Facts, § § 1, 3 (1964).
11. Id
12. Id at4.
13., Foster & Freed, Childrenand The Law, 2 Fain. L.Q. 40, 41 (1968).
14. Hunter, Child Cstody-Rebutting the Presumption of ParentalPreference, 43 MISS.
L.J. 247 (1972).
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petent jurisdiction that vests in a person the right to have physical
custody of the child, the right to determine where and with whom
he shall live, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline the
child and to provide him with food, shelter, education and ordinary
medical care ... s

New Mexico, as well as other jurisdictions, has traditionally acted in
its parens patriae role, 1 6 as guardian of all the state's children.
"(D)ependent and neglected children are placed under the jurisdiction and control of the district court, and the right of possession as
between the two litigants does not preclude the district court from
exercising its jurisdiction by making the child its ward .*.."'

' Chil-

dren who are delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision become
wards of the court, as do those placed in foster homes.' 8
Children are presumed to be incomplete beings who are not fully
competent to determine and safeguard their interests. They are ...
in need of direct, intimate, and continuous care.... The state seeks

to assure each child membership in a family with at least one such
adult whom the law designates 'parent'. 9
In New Mexico where one party is a parent and the other a
stranger, a parental right is found to be a prima facie, but not an
absolute, right. 2 Former custody alone is insufficient to establish a
prima facie right when the custodian was not a parent. 2' Moreover,
courts have held that when a mother with custody dies, custody does
revert to the father, and custodial rights descend
not automatically
22
to no one.
The New Mexico Department of Human Services has tried to avoid
placing Indian children in Anglo-American homes. Unfortunately this
is not always possible due to the scarcity of minority families willing
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. §32-1-3J (1978).
16. Ettinger v. Ettinger, 72 N.M. 300, 383 P.2d 261 (1963).
17. N.M. Dept. of Public Welfare v. Cromer, 52 N.M. 331, 334, 197 P.2d 902, 902
(1948).
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-9 (1978).
19. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. Solnit, Beyond The Best Interests of The Child, 3 (1973).
20. Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 535 P.2d 1341 (1975). In Shorty, the natural mother
wanted custody of her child. Respondent was the child's maternal grandmother who had
temporary custody of the child. The court favored the parental right doctrine and held that
a parent who can care for the child, wants to do so, and who has not been found unfit is
entitled to custody against the grandparents and others who have no permanent or legal
right to custody, Id at 493, 535 P.2d at 1344.
21. Roberts v. Staples, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788 (1968). In Roberts, the child's
maternal grandparents sought custody with a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied the
writ and held that the grandparents had no natural or inherent right to custody of the child
merely because they had had former custody. Former custody was not enough to establish a
prima facie right, Id at 300, 442 P.2d at 790.
22. State v. Marshall, 58 N.M. 286, 270 P.2d 702 (1954).
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and able to adopt. Sometimes such scarcity necessitates long waits
for child placement or placement with families of a different minority than the child they are adopting.2 3
INDIAN CUSTOM
In the Navajo culture custody traditionally lies with grandparents
as well as parents. 2 A conflict similar to the one in Adoption of
Doe is not a stranger-stranger controversy. "A Navajo feels himself a
part not only of his immediate biological family, but also what has
been called his 'extended' family. This consists of his mother's family
and his father's family, reaching far beyond the easily recognized
degrees of relationship. ."..

5

The extended family supplements the nurture and the instruction
given by the parents. A child is surrounded by a varied assortment of
kin in an extended camp and some of these will oversee the child if
his mother is doing chores, or if she needs help for some other

reason. In the case of the death of either parent or of divorce, the
extended family cushions the disruption of family life for the
child.2 6
Extended kinship is not unique to the Navajos but can be found in
almost all American Indian tribes. 2 7 Many state courts, confronted
with a conflict in classifying the status of an Indian grandparent,
have resolved such cases on a jurisdictional basis. When the child is
domiciled on the reservation, tribal law governs and the categorization, according to tribal custom, is closer to a parent-stranger controversy because grandparents are afforded "parent" status. If the
child lives off the reservation, state law is determinative and the case
is decided upon a stranger-stranger basis.
In Wisconsin Potowatomies of the HannahvilleIndian Community
v. Houston,25 the tribe was allowed to retain custody of three
orphaned children because the children were tribal members and the
court ruled that the matter was a tribal affair. In In re Adoption of
Bueh12 9 a Washington court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a
23. For the year ending July, 1977, thirteen Indian or part Indian children were placed
for adoption. Three went to Indian families, six to Anglo families, one to a Spanish-Anglo
family, two to Indian-Anglo families, and one to an Indian, Black-Anglo family. Telephone
interview with Heidi llanes, Adoption Services, Department of Human Services, Santa Fe,
New Mexico (Jan. 4, 1977).
24., A Leighton & D. Leighton, The Navajo Door (1944).
25. Id at 22.
26. M. Shepardson & B. Hammond, The Navajo Mountain Community 122 (1970).
27. McCartney, supra note 2, at 534.
28. 393 F. Supp. 719, 734 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
29. 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). In Buehl the mother and the child were
Blackfoot Indians enrolled as members of the tribe. The court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the Blackfoot reservation was outside the state.
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matter involving an out-of-state tribe. An Oregon court exercised
jurisdiction over Indian children who were not domiciled on a
reservation." The State of Washington assumed civil and criminal
jurisdiction over the Quinault Indians pursuant to a gubernatorial
proclamation. 3 Recently, an Alaskan court took jurisdiction of a
child custody dispute between parents because the mother lived in
Juneau. 2

The trend appears to be cultural dilution for those Indians who
choose to live outside reservation boundaries. 3 3 Within the reservation, tribal customs guide the governing council. Outside the reservation, state law is applied. The courts are, in essence, saying to the
American Indian that a home outside the reservation implies assimilation. Perhaps Indians who live off the reservation are indeed assimilated and have chosen to live within the Anglo-American mainstream
by their act of moving off the reservation. Perhaps it is the very
existence of Indian reservations, and tribal jurisdiction over them,
that has enabled the American Indian who remains on the reservation
to retain his identity more thoroughly than those of other minority
groups and to pass that identity on to his children.
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD DOCTRINE

Today, virtually every jurisdiction including New Mexico follows
the best interests of the child doctrine when deciding child custody
controversies. 3" Concern for the child's psychological and material
30. In re Greybull, 23 Ore. A. 674, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975). In Greybull the court never
considered the question of whether the children would be best raised by an Indian family,
particularly the paternal grandparents, but merely removed the children from their mother,
whom the court deemed unfit because of alcoholism.
31. Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 525 P.2d 217, appeal dismissed, 240 U.S.
915 (1974). In this case the tribal council resolved that state jurisdiction should be extended
to include the tribe and the reservation. Because of this express desire by the tribe, the
governor issued a proclamation giving the state court jurisdiction to temporarily place two
Quinault Indian children in a foster home over the objections of the children's parents.
32. Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972). On appeal Carle was reversed and
remanded. The trial court statement that "the village way of life is succumbing to the
predominant [sic] caucasian, urban society" was found to be an ambiguous and impermissible criterion for child custody. Id. at 1054.
33. [TIhe American Indian child-welfare crisis is of massive proportions. American
Indian families face vastly greater risks of involuntary separation than are typical of society
as a whole. Furthermore, most of their children must face the additional adjustment of
living in non-Indian environments much different from their own. McCartney, supra note 2,
at 530.
34. Ettinger v. Ettinger, 72 N.M. 300, 383 P.2d 261 (1963); Jones v. Jones, 67 N.M. 415,
356 P.2d 231 (1960); In re Guardianship of Howard, 66 N.M. 445, 349 P.2d 547 (1960);
State ex rel. Hockenhull v. Marshall, 58 N.M. 286, 270 P.2d 702 (1954); Bassett v. Bassett,
56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487 (1952); State ex rel. Day v. Parker, 55 N.M. 227, 230 P.2d 252
(1950); Cook v. Brownlee, 54 N.M. 227, 220 P.2d 378 (1950); Ex parte Pra, 34 N.M. 587,
286 P. 828 (1930).
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welfare is implicit in the criteria of best interests.3 s The court looks

at many factors: the moral character and the emotional stability of
the parties, the age and health of claimants and child, home conditions, religious beliefs, ethnic and racial background, financial
advantages, express wishes of the child's parent, personal preference
of the child, and stability of the child's environment. 3 6 The courts
recognize the one most likely to meet the child's psychological needs
as the "psychological parent." ' 3 The court looks at the circumstances of each case and to the person who can fill the child's needs
and "become his 'psychological parent' in whose care the child can
feel valued and wanted."'3 Continuity of surroundings has also been
recognized as vitally important to a child's well-being 3 ' especially

when the child is an infant or toddler. "Their attachments, at these
ages, are as thoroughly upset by separations as they are effectively

promoted by the constant, uninterrupted presence and attention of a
familiar adult."'4
The best interests doctrine is rarely applied in parent-stranger

controversies. It is presumed that a parent will be the best custodian
for the child and the stranger has the burden of rebutting that presumption. 4' This only occurs if the parent is found unfit.

When a stranger-stranger conflict arises the best interests doctrine
will be used by the courts to determine where custody should lie.
The court will look solely to the child's physical, psychological, and
emotional health and welfare.
35. Project, Alternatives To "Parental Right" in Child Custody DisputesInvolving Third
Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151, 157 (1963).
36. Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 290, 300 (1970).
Whenever a court is called upon to determine whether custody of a minor
child should be awarded to the grandparent of the child or to some other
person (except a parent of the child) or organization, it applies, as in all other
cases involving the custody of minor children, the so-called "best interests of
the child" doctrine, which stands for the proposition that custody should be
awarded in accordance with the best interest of the child regardless of claims
based on the particular status or legal relationship of the claimant to the child.
This does not mean, however, that, everything being equal, a grandparent will
not be favored ... or that a preferential status is not accorded to the child's
guardian or the person in loco parentis.
Id at 299.
37. Whenever [sic] any adult becomes the psychological parent of the child is
based on day to day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The
role can be filled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by
any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his
biological or legal relationship to the child may be.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 19.
38. Id at 5.
39. Project, supra note 35.
40. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 32.
41. Hunter, Child Custody-Rebutting The Presumption of ParentalPreference, 43 Miss.
L.J. 247, 247 (1972).
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In Adoption of Doe the difficulty arose when the conflict was
classified as a stranger-stranger controversy. Navajo custom would

classify the parties as parent and stranger. In that case the best
interests doctrine would not be applied unless the "parent"

was

found unfit.
THE COURT'S REASONING

The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Adoption of Doe,4 2 placed
its emphasis upon the needs of the child. It classified the controversy
as a stranger-stranger conflict and applied the best interests of the
child doctrine. The court found the grandfather's claim of physical
custody without merit since actual physical custody for two months
had been with petitioners.4 The court also determined that "the
grandfather had no natural or inherent right to custody of the
child" 4 4 even though Navajo custom and tradition recognizes grandparents as custodians of their grandchildren.4a The court felt that
Navajo custom was subordinate to New Mexico state law because the
parties did not reside on the reservation.4 6 The court, therefore, did
not feel constrained to follow tribal tradition and acknowledge the
grandfather's right to custody. In applying the best interests of the
child doctrine, moreover, the grandfather was found to be unfit to
have custody due to alcoholism. 4 This alcoholism, which allegedly
created an unstable home, was the reason the mother gave for placing
her son for adoption. The grandfather's frequent absences from home

4
was another factor which contributed to his being found unfit. 8
The father joined the appeal in an effort to obtain custody of his
son for himself. The court held the father's rights negligible because
of his earlier abandonment of the child. 4 9
The court placed importance upon the mother's express wish that

42. 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976).
43. Id at 613, 555 P.2d at 913.
44. Id
45. Id
46. The cases seem to indicate that when the parties are domiciled on the reservation
state courts have no jurisdiction, and the issue is to be resolved by tribal council. In
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832), the Court determined that "Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities. . . . The very
term 'nation' so generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from others' " and the
Cherokee Nation was determined not to be bound by the laws of Georgia. The care and
custody of Indian children was of Indian concern, an internal Indian affair. In Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973), the Supreme Court held that "Indians
going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory
state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of that state."
47. 89 N.M. at 614, 555 P.2d at 914.
48. Id
49. Id at 621, 555 P.2d at 921. "We approve the definition of abandonment stated in
D.M. v. State, Alaska, 515 P.2d 1234 (1973), '(A)bandonment consists of conduct on the
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the child be placed with a Caucasian couple. She had lived with
non-Indian relatives for thirteen years and did not identify with the
Navajo culture." 0 Having ruled out the father and grandfather, the
court determined it was in the best interests of the child to affirm
the trial court's grant of petitioner's adoption decree.'
CONCLUSION
Because the grandfather was found unfit for custody the New
Mexico Court of Appeals never reached the key issue of whether the
court would categorize the grandfather's status as that of "parent" or
"stranger." If a stranger-stranger classification is made, and the best
interests of the child doctrine is applied, the court's responsibility is
to the child. Only his needs should be taken into account. The
cultural shock of removing a child from one environment and placing
him in another unfamiliar one is an important factor to be considered in the best interests doctrine. The weight it is given should
depend upon the child's needs, his age, and whether his home had
adopted an Anglo-American lifestyle. The contesting parties'
interests should always be secondary, for the court, in its role as
parens patriae should not give weight to their interests in determining
adoption placement.
State courts should attempt to apply the best interests of the child
doctrine in light of that child's culture. Even though a child is from a
minority group threatened with depopulation by removal of its children, the sociological needs of the group must not be paramount to
the welfare of the child. A proper categorization of an Indian grandparent's status would help resolve conflicting needs. Whatever the
outcome, it should be faced squarely by the courts and not sidestepped as a jurisdictional issue.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals made an attempt to consider
Navajo custom in Adoption of Doe although the court did award
custody to an Anglo-American family. This interest in Navajo custom
should be expanded if similar conflicts arise. That expansion may be
significant enough to elevate the status of a grandparent to a
"parent." This change in classification would give proper emphasis to
tribal custom and would help to minimize the price of mainstreaming
American Indian children.
JANE G. PRINTZ
part of the parent which implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent
to the child, leading to the destruction of the parent-child relationship," 89 N.M. at 618,
555 P.2d at 918. The father had consented to the adoption and had signed the adoption
form. Evidence pointed to an absence of a parental relationship between the father and the
child. It appears that the father's appeal was based upon a dislike of the grandfather and an
attempt to thwart his effort to adopt the child.
50. 89 N.M. at 614, 555 P.2d at 914.
51. Id. at 622, 555 P.2d at 922.

